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Sustainability is a political choice, not a technical one. It’s not a
1
question of whether we can be sustainable, but whether we choose to be.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sustainable development has been on the international agenda for decades,
yet difficulties persist in developing an effective regime to address it. Problems
with developing an effective legal regime to address sustainable development
began in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
2
Development (“UNCED”) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. UNCED marked the

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2014; B.A. Political
Science, minors in Legal Studies and Mathematics, California Lutheran University, 2011. I would like to thank
my faculty advisor, Professor Rachael Salcido, for her valuable insight and guidance throughout the
development of this comment. I would also like to thank my family for their encouragement and support.
1. Quote from Gary Lawrence, Director, Seattle Planning Department. Agriculture & Sustainable
Development, CHANGING THE PRESENT, http://changingthepresent.org/cause/2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
2. PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE
ENVIRONMENT 50 (3d ed. 2009).
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point where sustainable development became a primary focus of the international
3
agenda. UNCED produced two outcome documents—the Rio Declaration on
4
5
Environment and Development and Agenda 21 —that attempted to balance the
needs of both developing and developed countries in regard to sustainable
6
development. Yet in attempting to strike this balance, economic development
7
was prioritized over environmental protection.
Problems with implementing an effective sustainable development regime
persisted ten years later at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable
8
Development (“WSSD”) held in Johannesburg, South Africa. By this time,
sustainable development was no longer the primary focus of the international
9
10
agenda, resulting in relatively weak outcomes from the summit. Because of
11
this, WSSD was generally seen as a disappointment.
In June 2012, the international community convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
12
for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (“UNCSD”).
UNCSD is commonly referred to as Rio+20 since it marked a return to Rio de
13
Janeiro twenty years after the 1992 UNCED. The conference concentrated on
two themes related to sustainable development: 1) developing a green economy
14
in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and 2)
15
developing the institutional framework for sustainable development. The
16
outcome of the conference was a document entitled “The Future We Want.”
17
Rio+20 and its outcome document have been heavily criticized as weak and
18
doing little to advance the goals of sustainable development.

3. Id. at 53.
4. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
5. See U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (June 14, 1992) [hereinafter
Agenda 21].
6. See Michael J. Kelly, Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International
Environmental Agreements, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 447, 453 (1997).
7. Id.
8. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 52–53.
9. See id. at 53.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See generally About the Rio+20 Conference, RIO+20-UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
13. Christopher C. Horner, An Assessment of the June 2012 Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable
Development, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 60, 60 (2012).
14. The Future We Want, G.A. Res. 66/288, ¶ 12, U.N. DOC. A/RES/66/288, Annex (Sept. 11, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See generally id.
17. Anne-Sophie Tabau, International, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 167, 168 (2012).
18. E.g. David Banisar et al., Moving From Principles to Rights: Rio 2012 and Access to Information,
Public Participation, and Justice, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2012, at 8.
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In the background of these efforts lies the tension between developing and
developed countries. Developing countries view sustainable development as a
means of socio-economic upward mobility that will help solve their problems
19
with poverty. Conversely, developed countries view sustainable development as
20
21
a quality of life issue that requires immediate protection of the environment.
Efforts to reconcile these divergent viewpoints have proven to be difficult, and
22
most recently resulted in Rio+20’s one-sided outcome document.
This Comment argues that the outcome document of Rio+20 favors the
perspective of developing countries and will therefore ultimately prove to be
ineffective at advancing sustainable development on a global scale. First, this
Comment explores the concept of sustainable development and the different
23
viewpoints of developing and developed countries in relation to it. Then, it
discusses the Rio+20 Conference, its outcomes, how the outcome document
24
reflects the divergent viewpoints, and the conference’s successes and failures.
Lastly, it will conclude with an explanation of the future of sustainable
25
development given the outcomes of Rio+20.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is an evolving concept in international
26
27
environmental law. It lacks any universally agreed upon definition, but is seen
as a compromise between environmental protection on the one hand and
28
economic development on the other “that meets the needs of the present without
29
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” This

19. Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
20. Id.
21. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
22. See infra Part III.A.2.
23. See infra Parts II.A–B.
24. See infra Parts III.A–B.
25. See infra Part III.C.
26. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, The Role of International Forums in the Advancement of Sustainable
Development, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 4 (2009).
27. Hari M. Osofsky, Defining Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 2002, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 111, 112 (2003); Luis A. Aviles, Sustainable Development and the Legal Protection of the
Environment in Europe, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 29, 29 (2012).
28. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 55.
29. Brundtland Comm’n, Report of the World Commission on Environmental & Development: Our
Common Future, ch. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter Brundtland Report].
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30

concept is anthropocentric rather than ecocentric, it emphasizes the needs of
31
32
human beings rather than focusing on the needs of the ecosystem as a whole.
When the modern era of international environmental law began at the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Conference”),
the concept of sustainable development was just emerging in the international
33
community. The Stockholm Conference produced the Stockholm Declaration
34
on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”). Even though the
35
Stockholm Declaration was “soft law,” in that it did not have a binding effect, it
36
struck a balance between the needs of developing and developed countries and
37
set the tone for international environmental policies in the years to come.
For example, Principles 13 and 14 incorporate components of environmental
protection in development planning by urging states to adopt rational planning
38
techniques that consider the environment. Furthermore, Principles 8 and 9
recognize the importance of economic and social development in developing
countries and call for financial and technological transfers to assist developing
39
countries in their sustainable development efforts. Additionally, under the
Stockholm Declaration, all countries continue to have an obligation to conserve
40
the environment for future generations. Yet, the highlight of the Stockholm
Declaration is Principle 21, which grants countries the right to exploit their
natural resources to further environmental policies so long as they do not cause
41
environmental harm outside of their borders. Principle 21 has been well
42
received and now reflects customary international law.

30. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 118.
31. E.g., id. at 111.
32. E.g., id.; see also Aviles, supra note 27, at 29.
33. The phrase sustainable development was not used until the Brundtland Commission issued “Our
Common Future” in 1987. See Brundtland Report, supra note 29; see also Aviles, supra note 27, at 29.
34. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF G.48/14/rev.1
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
35. Kelly, supra note 6, at 451.
36. See generally Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34.
37. Kelly, supra note 6, at 451.
38. “States should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to
ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve environment.” Stockholm
Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 13. “Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any
conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect and improve the environment.” Id. at princ.
14.
39. Id. at princ. 8–9.
40. Id. at princ. 1–5.
41. Id. at princ. 21.
42. Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational Environmental Treaties as Customary International
Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1085, 1148 (2007). See also Kelly, supra note 6,
at 451.
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The concept of sustainable development finds its roots in the Brundtland
43
Report. Following the Stockholm Conference, the World Commission on
44
Environment and Development issued the Brundtland Report in 1987. The
45
Brundtland Report was the first to use the term “sustainable development.” Like
the approach taken under the Stockholm Declaration, the Brundtland Report
recommends that sustainable development adopt a balancing approach in
46
furthering environmental protection and economic development. It defines
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
47
needs.” Under this definition, sustainable development is a process of change in
which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation
of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and
48
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.
49
This balancing approach was then put into effect a few years later at UNCED.
In 1992, countries from around the world gathered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
for UNCED. UNCED made sustainable development a “leading concept of
50
international environmental policy.” Two of the primary documents responsible
for this result were the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (“Rio
51
52
Declaration”) and Agenda 21.
These documents attempted to balance the needs of both developing and
developed countries; however, they tipped the balance in favor of economic
53
development. Most notably, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which
allowed countries to exploit their own natural resources as long as their actions
54
did not cause environmental harm beyond their borders, was reaffirmed in
55
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. However, Principle 2 goes one step further
and allows countries to exploit their natural resources, not only for environmental
56
objectives, but for economic development as well. This shift in the power
struggle between economic development and environmental protection has

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Brundtland Report, supra note 29.
Id.
BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
See Brundtland Report, supra note 29.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 15.
See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 4; see generally Agenda 21, supra note 5.
BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53.
See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 4.
See generally Agenda 21, supra note 5.
Kelly, supra note 6, at 453.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 21.
Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 2; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 55.
Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 21; PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 2012).

111

05_ELLISON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2014 4:30 PM

2014 / Sustainable Development Efforts
continued to favor economic development at the expense of environmental
57
protection ever since.
Ten years later, sustainable development had taken a backseat on the
international agenda. In 2002, the United Nations convened the World Summit
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. WSSD’s main
contribution to the sustainable development regime was adding a third pillar to
58
the concept of sustainable development. Along with environmental protection
and economic development, social development became a recognized element of
59
sustainable development. Despite this contribution, WSSD was seen as a
60
disappointment overall. The outcome documents of WSSD—the Declaration on
61
62
Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation —are relatively weak
63
compared to the Rio Declaration, in that they do not set forth any new
64
principles, nor do they establish a plan for the future. As a result, sustainable
development, and international environmental law in general, were no longer
65
seen as priorities for the international community.
After WSSD, proponents for getting sustainable development back on the
global radar stressed that what was needed was “implementation of the Rio
instruments and more progress towards the goals already agreed” upon by the
66
international community. International leaders approached Rio+20 in June 2012
with the achievements and problems of previous environmental conferences in
67
mind.
B. Developing and Developed Countries
Underlying all of these international conferences on sustainable development
is the sharp tension between developing and developed countries, due to their
68
divergent viewpoints on how to approach sustainable development. These
57. See Todd B. Adams, Is There A Legal Future For Sustainable Development in Global Warming?
Justice, Economics, and Protecting the Environment, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 100 (2003).
58. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 123.
59. Id.
60. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53.
61. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Sept. 2-4, 2002, Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20.
62. Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4,
2002).
63. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53.
64. Id.
65. Id. (finding “environmental issues have once again become peripheral concerns of global
governance”).
66. Id.
67. See Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development, RIO+20 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=12&nr=228&menu=
63 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
68. Kelly, supra note 6, at 454–55.

112

05_ELLISON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2014 4:30 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27
remarkably different perspectives have led to the tension between the two groups
69
as they struggle to define and implement sustainable development. The tension
can be seen most recently in the negotiations and outcomes of the Rio+20
70
Conference. This section explores the views of and differences between
developing and developed countries.
1. Perspective of Developing Countries
Leadership in developing countries is primarily concerned with upward
mobility, sovereignty, the costs of sustainable development, and the causes of
71
environmental degradation.
Developing countries approach sustainable
development from the viewpoint of a need within their countries for socio72
economic upward mobility. It is difficult for leaders in these countries to
prioritize the environment when other domestic issues, such as poverty and
hunger, are left unresolved, and the country could benefit from exploiting natural
73
resources. Unlike in developed countries, one of the main causes of
74
environmental degradation in developing countries is poverty. Therefore,
developing countries view development as a way of helping their countries
75
overcome these problems. This often results in prioritizing development over
76
environmental protection. Thus, the underlying problem of poverty must be
addressed for sustainable development to become practicable for developing
77
countries.
Likewise, sovereignty is a major concern for leaders in developing countries
78
in approaching negotiations for sustainable development. Many leaders in
developing countries are fearful and resentful of encroachment by developed
79
countries into their internal, domestic environmental policies. Thus, they stress
the importance of doctrines like those found in Principle 21 of the Stockholm
80
81
Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration that allow them to exploit

69. Id. at 455.
70. See generally United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
20-22, 2012, Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.216/16.
71. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 454–56.
72. Id. at 454.
73. Id. at 455.
74. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115.
75. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 455–56.
76. See id.
77. This is part of the rationale behind emphasizing the green economy in light of sustainable
development and poverty eradication as a theme of Rio+20. See id.
78. See id.
79. E.g., id. at 455.
80. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 21.
81. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 2.
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their natural resources as long as it does not cause environmental harm beyond
82
their borders.
There is also tension between developing and developed countries over the
83
costs and burdens of sustainable development. Developing countries believe
that since developed countries have historically been responsible for causing
environmental degradation themselves, developed countries should bear more of
84
the costs and burdens of sustainable development than developing countries.
Similarly, since part of the reason developed countries were able to prosper in the
85
first place was because they exploited their natural resources, leaders of
developing countries often are unsympathetic when developed countries urge
86
them to forego the same exploitation process. In fact, leaders in developing
87
countries find this proposition fundamentally unfair.
There is also tension over what is more harmful to the environment:
88
overpopulation or overconsumption. People in developing countries tend to
89
believe overconsumption causes more harm. Thus, developed countries with
90
higher per capita consumption cause more harm, and should bear a greater share
91
of the costs and burdens of sustainable development. This is in sharp contrast to
the views of leaders in developed countries that tend to believe overpopulation
92
causes more environmental harm. Accordingly, they believe developing
93
countries with higher population growth should share in the costs and burdens
94
of sustainable development.
The negotiations at UNCED provide an example of how developing
countries have approached sustainable development in constructing international
environmental law. These countries will typically bind together as a group to
combat the influence of wealthier, more politically powerful, developed
95
At UNCED, developing countries approached sustainable
countries.

82. Id.
83. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
84. See Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115; see also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
85. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115; Kelly, supra note 6, at 455.
86. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115; Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
87. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115; Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
88. See Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion on how developed countries
approach this question.
89. See Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. E.g., BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 50–51 (notably, developing countries were not able to act as a
group on the topic of climate change due to their unique geographic features, which result in different impacts
from climate change. However, these concerns about climate change do not invade developing countries’
approach to addressing sustainable development as a group).
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96

development with an emphasis on creating long-term goals and policies. As a
group, developing countries were also concerned about encroachment on
97
98
sovereignty within their territories, as reflected in the Rio Declaration and
99
Agenda 21. Because of this concern, leaders of developing countries resisted
any approach to sustainable development that might threaten their right to exploit
100
their natural resources. This ultimately resulted in reaffirming Principle 21 of
101
the Stockholm Declaration, which allows countries to exploit their own
resources to further domestic environmental policies and goals, with the
102
limitation that they must refrain from causing harm beyond their borders.
UNCED also addressed developing countries’ view that they should not
share as much of a burden as developed countries in sustainable development by
103
calling for technology transfers from developed to developing countries. By
placing the burden on developed countries, this solution was a way to make it
easier for developing countries to meet sustainability goals because they would
not be required to invest in a more expensive infrastructure to pursue sustainable
104
development. When this assistance is implemented effectively, it also helps
offset the feeling that sovereignty is being infringed upon because developed
countries are being helped to gain technology that produces less of a negative
105
impact on the environment. It was with this precedent and concern about
upward mobility, sovereignty, the costs of sustainable development, and the
causes of environmental degradation that leaders from developing countries
106
approached Rio+20.
2. Perspective of Developed Countries
Leadership in developed countries is primarily concerned with sustainable
development as a quality of life issue, with environmental degradation being
107
principally caused by overpopulation.
Developed countries approach
sustainable development from a different starting point than developing
108
countries. Because developed countries are more economically secure, they

96. Id. at 51.
97. Id.
98. See Rio Declaration, supra note 4.
99. See Agenda 21, supra note 5, ¶¶ 40.7, 40.19.
100. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
101. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 21; Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 2.
102. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 21.
103. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 9; Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 34.
104. See Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 9; see Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 34.4.
105. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
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109

tend to focus on sustainable development as a quality of life issue. Thus, when
the environmental movement emerged in developed countries in the late 1960s
110
and early 1970s, emphasis was placed more on protecting the earth’s natural
111
resources than on economic development. Ever since, developed countries have
traditionally approached sustainable development from an environmental
112
protectionist point of view. To this end, sustainable development is seen as an
immediate problem, which needs immediate, but not necessarily long-term,
113
Developing countries generally prioritize long-term goals in
solutions.
114
sustainable development and do not share this concern.
In the debate as to whether overpopulation or overconsumption causes more
environmental harm, people from developed countries tend to believe
115
overpopulation causes more harm. From this perspective, developing countries
cause more environmental harm than developed countries because they have
rapidly expanding population growth leading to greater consumption of resources
116
compared to developed countries with relatively stable population growth.
Thus, developing countries should share in the costs and burdens of sustainable
117
development since they are partially responsible for environmental harms. Yet,
this mindset conflicts with the viewpoint of developing countries, whose leaders
118
believe overconsumption in developed countries causes more harm, and
consequently developed countries should bear more of the costs and burdens of
119
sustainable development.
Developed countries approached UNCED from this point of view and were
120
looking for immediate solutions to environmental degradation. For these
121
countries, environmental protection was the priority.
Concerns about
122
environmental protection can be seen throughout the Rio Declaration and
123
Agenda 21. For example, Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration specifically

109. Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
110. E.g., David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of Environmental Law
in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 145 (1995).
111. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
112. Id.
113. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
114. Id.
115. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
121. E.g., Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
122. E.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 4.
123. E.g., Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 16.20 (“[e]nvironmental protection is an integral component of
sustainable development.”).
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stressed that “environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the
124
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.”
Furthermore, the position from which developed countries approach
sustainable development as a quality of life issue was also seen in the Rio
125
126
Declaration and Agenda 21. For instance, Agenda 21 noted that sustainable
development should address environmental concerns from a holistic point of
127
view that included improving the quality of life for all.
Emphasis on overpopulation as the main cause for environmental
128
degradation also took root at UNCED. In particular, Agenda 21 recognized that
129
population growth adds stress to life-supporting natural resources, that
130
population programs are needed to aid sustainable development, and that
sustainable development policies should reflect the consequences of population
131
growth. It was from this starting point with concerns about quality of life and
overpopulation that developed countries approached Rio+20.
III. RIO+20
Rio+20 was held between June 20 and 22, 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
under a remarkably different political climate than UNCED held twenty years
132
earlier.
Specifically, the recent financial and economic crises influenced the
133
choices and motivations of policymakers. Looming in the background was the
belief that the sustainable development regime needed improvement because
current development and economic policies were largely responsible for many of
134
the world’s social, environmental, and economic problems.
Still other
policymakers went into Rio+20 with a political climate urging them to scale back

124. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 4.
125. E.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 8 (“[t]o achieve sustainable development and a higher
quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.”).
126. E.g., Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 5.16, 5.43.
127. Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 5.16.
128. See, e.g., Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 5.16, 5.3, 5.43; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at
princ. 8 (“[s]tates should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and
promote appropriate demographic policies.”).
129. Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 5.3.
130. Id. at ¶ 5.43.
131. Id. at ¶ 5.16.
132. Roger Martella & Kim Smaczniak, Introduction to Rio + 20: A Reflection on Progress since the
First Earth Summit and the Opportunities that Lie Ahead, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 6 ( 2012).
133. Id.
134. J.C. Suresh, UN Stresses Role of Science for Peace and Development, IDN-INDEPTHNEWS (Nov. 10,
2012), http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1256-un-stresses-role-of-science-for-peace-anddevelopment.
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on “international support, rather than [increase] financial or other commitments
135
of resources toward sustainable development.”
Also menacing ominously in the background was the fact that little progress
had been achieved in regard to advancing sustainable development since
136
UNCED. The sustainable development paradigm was seen as too fragmented; it
lacked coordination and had problems with enforcement, efficiency, and
137
engagement of non-state actors. Part of the objective of Rio+20, as the twentyyear follow-up to UNCED, was to renew past commitments to sustainable
development, assess progress, identify implementation gaps, and address new
138
challenges in the sustainable development field.
Unfortunately, Rio+20
139
ultimately failed to address these concerns.
A. Outcomes
The outcomes of Rio+20 reflect the needs of developing countries at the
140
expense of the views of developed countries. The outcome document for
141
Rio+20 is entitled “The Future We Want.” The conference adopted the themes
of developing a global green economy and reforming the institutional framework
142
for sustainable development. In particular, the conference sought to begin the
process of establishing sustainable development goals, developing a framework
for implementing the green economy, and establishing sustainability reporting
143
measures in industry. Commitments contained in “The Future We Want” cover
a wide range of areas including jobs, energy, urbanization, food security, water,
144
oceans, and readiness for natural disasters. All commitments stated within the
145
document are voluntary, and the document has no binding effect.
One of the key outcomes of the conference was recognizing that little had
146
been done since UNCED to advance sustainable development. To begin to
address problems with sustainable development, the outcome document sought to

135. Martella & Smaczniak, supra note 132, at 6.
136. Aviles, supra note 27, at 31.
137. Martella & Smaczniak, supra at note 132, at 6.
138. Marianne Kettunen & Patrick ten Brink, Nature, Green Economy and Sustainable Development: The
Outcomes of UN Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, NATURE CONSERVATION, Aug. 24, 2012, at
1, available at http://www.pensoft.net/journals/natureconservation/article/3704/.
139. See infra Part III.B.
140. See infra Part III.A.i–ii.
141. The Future We Want, supra note 14.
142. Id. at ¶ 12, 19; Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 1–2.
143. UN Experts Call for More Protection of Human Rights of Vulnerable Groups Affected by Business
Activities, UN NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43412
&Cr=business&Cr1=.
144. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
145. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 283; Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 4.
146. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 20; Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
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reaffirm previous commitments. Thus, paragraph 1 states that the parties
“renew [their] commitment to sustainable development and to ensuring the
promotion of an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future
148
for our planet and for present and future generations.” In the same vein, the
parties made additional commitments to address implementation gaps from
149
previous conferences.
Overall, “The Future We Want” largely reflects the views of developing
150
countries at the expense of the views of developed countries. This is evident in
the numerous times developing countries are mentioned in the outcome
document, how the themes of the conference were addressed, the topics covered,
151
and responses by these groups to the outcome document. This section will first
address how the outcome document exemplifies the views of developing
countries, and then it will discuss how the perspective of developed countries
was missing from “The Future We Want.”
1. Reflecting the Views of Developing Countries
The views of developing countries predominate throughout every section of
152
“The Future We Want.” The sheer number of times developing countries are
mentioned, especially unnecessarily, is one way that the outcome document
153
subliminally favors the views of developing countries. In fact, developing
countries are specifically referred to over one hundred times throughout the
154
document. Paragraph 11 provides a typical example of how developing
countries are referred to in “The Future We Want.” Paragraph 11 reaffirms
commitments “to strengthen international cooperation to address challenges
related to sustainable development for all, in particular in developing
155
countries.” Like the reference in paragraph 11, singling out developing
countries is unnecessary and overly excessive the majority of the time they are
156
mentioned in “The Future We Want.” It is unnecessary and excessive because
when a principle applies to all countries, the document makes a point of stating
157
that it should apply particularly to developing countries. For instance,
paragraph 19 states that the parties “affirm the continued need for the full and

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 1, 14–18.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 104.
See infra Part III.A.1–2.
See infra Part III.A.1–2.
See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
See generally id.
See id.
Id. at ¶ 11.
See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 19, 20, 25, 91, 128, 190, 205, 227, 253.
E.g., id.
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effective participation of all countries, in particular developing countries, in
158
global decision-making.” Yet, if the participation of all countries is necessary,
then there is no need to single out developing countries, and the insertion is
superfluous. As a further example, consider paragraph 20, which acknowledges
that part of the reason for little progress in advancing sustainable development
since 1992 has to do with new crises that have hampered “all countries, in
159
particular developing countries.” If the crises hindered sustainable development
efforts in all countries, then why was it necessary or even appropriate to add that
this was so particularly in developing countries?
Additionally, the theme of developing a global green economy in the context
of sustainable development and poverty eradication further evidences that
Rio+20 favors developing countries. The green economy is envisioned as “a low
carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive economy that aims to improve
human well-being and social equity while significantly reducing environmental
160
risks and ecological scarcities.”
“The Future We Want” seeks to implement a global green economy by
allowing countries to adopt different approaches on how to make the green
161
economy a reality. In other words, there “should not be a rigid set of rules” for
162
putting the green economy into effect. Instead, each country can choose a path
163
that is appropriate with its own domestic sustainable development policies.
Part of the reason behind the lack of concrete specifications of the green
164
economy is that the terms “sustainable development,” and “green economy”
165
lack universally agreed upon definitions. Thus, the G-77 Group and China have
166
found the term “green economy” to be “undefined and ambiguous.” This
ambiguity has led to two opposing views on how to think about the green
167
economy. Leaders from developed countries envision the green economy as a
168
way to “transition to a cleaner and more resource-efficient economy.” Leaders
in developing countries, however, see the green economy as a means of “green
growth” that will allow their countries to prosper while using less
169
environmentally harmful business practices.
158. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 19.
159. Id. at ¶ 20.
160. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
161. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 56.
162. Id.
163. Id. at ¶ 59.
164. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 112.
165. Horner, supra note 13, at 62.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 63.
169. At UN-backed Conference, African Countries Adopt Sustainable Development Measures, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42897&Cr=sustainable+develop
ment&Cr1=. See also Horner, supra note 13, at 63.
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The lack of definitions and conflicting visions ultimately favors developing
countries because some leaders in developing countries are antagonistic towards
170
the concept of a global green economy. For example, Venezuela resents the
171
concept of the green economy and even refers to it as “green capitalism.”
Bolivia also epitomizes the hostility of developing countries towards the concept
of a green economy by stressing that, ultimately, countries should consider that
172
“the green of nature prevails over the green of money and profit.” Without
agreement on how to advance the concept of a green economy, Rio+20 favors
developing countries because it prevents developed countries from implementing
173
concepts that developing countries vehemently oppose.
174
“The Future We Want” also aims at eradicating poverty. “The Future We
175
Want” follows past outcome documents like the Rio Declaration, which
recognized the need to eradicate poverty as a requirement for sustainable
176
development. Yet, unlike past outcome documents, the emphasis on eradicating
poverty is at the forefront; in fact, poverty is mentioned over fifty times in “The
177
Future We Want.” This was an important aspect of the outcome document for
developing countries because poverty has been a major obstacle to fully
178
implementing sustainable development practices in the past. As discussed
179
previously, leaders of developing countries find it difficult to prioritize
sustainable development when exploitation of their natural resources can be used
180
as a tool for social-economic upward-mobility.
Accordingly, leaders
acknowledge in “The Future We Want” that poverty “is the greatest global
181
challenge facing the world today” and stress “the importance of supporting
182
developing countries in their efforts to eradicate poverty.” This emphasis on
poverty suggests the outcome document favors developing countries since
reducing poverty helps them gain the ability to participate in sustainable
183
development efforts, which is not an obstacle for developed nations.
170. Horner, supra note 13, at 62.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 122.
174. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 12.
175. Id. at ¶ 15.
176. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 5.
177. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14. Note that the Rio Declaration only mentions
poverty once. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at Principle 5.
178. E.g., Osofsky, supra note 27, at 123–24 (referring to Agenda 21).
179. See supra Part II.B.1.
180. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 455.
181. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 2. “Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable and
promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production and protecting and managing the natural
resource base of economic and social development are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements
for sustainable development.” Id. at ¶ 4.
182. Id. at ¶ 23.
183. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 455.
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Moreover, the outcome document prioritizes the needs of developing
countries by calling for technology transfers from developed to developing
184
185
countries. Developing countries generally support technology transfers. The
transfers make it easier for developing countries to meet sustainability goals
186
because they do not have to invest in expensive infrastructure. “The Future We
Want” specifically points out the importance of technology transfers from
187
developed to developing countries as a means of closing the technology gap
188
between the two groups. Despite this call for action, the outcome document
189
contains little guidance regarding which technologies should be transferred
190
and, at best, encourages voluntary donations from the international community.
Leaders of many developing countries see the emphasis on technology transfers
191
as a victory. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea wants to
use “The Future We Want” as a tool for facilitating technology transfers from
192
developed to developing countries in the future. Yet if technology transfers
193
were called for in the past and did not occur, why would Rio+20 be any
different?
Moreover, “The Future We Want” favors developing countries by respecting
194
their concerns about sovereignty within their borders. Like the Stockholm and
195
the Rio Declarations, “The Future We Want” adopts the policy of respecting
national sovereignty to the extent that each country is entitled to exploit its own
196
natural resources. This is an important component of the document because
leadership in developing countries is fearful of encroachment by developed

184. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 73–74 (“the efforts of developing countries that choose to
implement green economy policies . . . should be supported through technical and technological assistance.”).
185. Matthew Burns, Comment, A Sustainable Framework for International Green Technology Transfer,
23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 405, 411–12 (2012).
186. See supra Part II.B.1.
187. E.g., The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 73.
188. See id. at ¶ 48.
189. Id. at ¶ 187.
190. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 48, 73, 74, 187, 191.
191. See UNGA Debate Speakers Urge Post-2015 Cohesiveness, Rio+20 Implementation, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT POLICY & PRACTICE, (Oct. 1, 2012), http://uncsd.iisd.org/news/unga-debate-speakers-urge-post2015-cohesiveness-rio20-implementation/158364/ [hereinafter: UNGA Debate Speakers]; see, e.g., Advancing
Internet Access in Developing Countries Can Help Achieve Sustainable Economies–UN official, UN NEWS
CENTRE, (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43459&Cr=internet&Cr1=(Haiyan
Qian, Director of the Division for Public Administration and Development Management of the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, believes technology transfers will help developing countries with
economic growth.).
192. UNGA Debate Speakers, supra note 191.
193. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 9.
194. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2. See also supra Part II.B.1 (regarding leaders of
developing countries concerns about sovereignty).
195. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at princ. 21; Rio
Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 2.
196. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 58; Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
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countries into their domestic environmental programs. Thus, respect for
sovereignty is yet another way “The Future We Want” favors the views of
198
developing countries. Therefore, given the contents of “The Future We Want,”
199
the views of developing countries were prioritized at Rio+20.
2. The Missing Viewpoint
The views of developed countries on sustainable development are largely
200
absent from “The Future We Want.” This can be seen from the number of times
developed countries are mentioned, when they are mentioned, the issues covered
201
in the document, and participation by leaders of developed countries at
202
Rio+20.
The absence of the views of developed countries can be seen from the
number of times and the context in which developed countries are mentioned in
203
“The Future We Want.” Compared to developing countries, which were
mentioned over one hundred times, developed countries are mentioned
204
specifically only about ten times. A typical example of when developed
countries are specifically referred to can be found in paragraph 48, which
recognizes the need to work together in closing the technology gap between
205
developed and developing countries. Although it is true that previous outcome
documents such as the Rio Declaration, rarely singled out developed countries,
206
they also did not single out developing countries as much. For example, the Rio
207
Declaration only mentioned developed countries once, yet it also only
208
mentioned developing countries twice. The newfound disproportionality in
“The Future We Want” illustrates but one way the views of developing countries
209
are given precedence over those of developed countries.
Furthermore, as can be seen in the example above, when developed countries
are mentioned, it is mostly in the context of how they can be used as tools to aid
210
developing countries with funding and technology transfers. As another
example, consider paragraph 258, which demonstrates an instance where
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Kelly, supra note 6, at 454–55.
See supra Part III.A.i.
See supra Part III.A.
See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
See generally id.
Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
See generally id.
Id. at ¶ 48.
See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 4.
Id. at princ. 7.
Id. at princs. 6, 11.
See supra Part III.A.ii.
E.g., The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 258.
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211

developed countries are singled out. This paragraph calls for developed
countries to keep previous commitments to devote 0.7 percent of their gross
national product to assist developing countries, and 0.15 to 0.2 percent to assist
212
least developed countries by 2015. Yet developed countries generally are
213
opposed to new commitments for funding and technology transfers. For
example, the United States opposed such commitments as an outcome from
214
Rio+20. Since developed countries are principally only mentioned in the
context of what they can do for developing countries, the outcome document
favors developing countries by prioritizing their need for assistance over the
215
needs of developed countries.
The issues covered within “The Future We Want” also demonstrate how the
document reflects the views of developing countries at the expense of developed
216
countries. The approach to population growth and quality of life issues are
217
illustrative of the missing viewpoint of developed countries. As discussed
218
above, developed countries see increased population growth in developing
219
countries as a primary cause for environmental degradation. Leaders of
developed countries were able to work this concern into past documents such as
220
Agenda 21, which recognized the problem of overpopulation. They called for
221
the development of population programs and forwarded a policy of considering
222
the consequences of overpopulation in sustainable development efforts.
However, “The Future We Want” glosses over this concern by failing to
223
acknowledge population growth as a problem for environmental degradation
and merely acknowledging that there is an increased need for sustainable
development because “the world’s population [is] projected to exceed 9 billion
224
by 2050.” Therefore, the missing viewpoint of developed countries on
overpopulation as a major cause of environmental harm is a substantial flaw in
225
“The Future We Want.”

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., JANE A. LEGGETT & NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42573, RIO+20: THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2012).
214. Id.
215. See supra Part III.A.2.
216. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
217. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 30.
218. See supra Part II.B.2.
219. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 115.
220. Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶ 5.3.
221. Id. at ¶ 5.43.
222. Id. at ¶ 5.16.
223. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
224. Id. at ¶ 21.
225. See supra Part III.A.2.
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Moreover, “The Future We Want” fails to consider sustainable development
226
as a quality of life issue. Unlike previous agreements that specifically refer to
227
sustainable development in the context of quality of life, “The Future We
Want” does not contain any statements referring to sustainable development as a
228
quality of life issue. To be fair, it does refer to issues such as poverty, which are
229
encompassed within a broader definition of the quality of life concept, but it
230
does not mention quality of life specifically like the Rio Declaration or Agenda
231
21. The Rio Declaration explicitly envisioned sustainable development as a
232
means of achieving a higher quality of life in Principle 8. Likewise, Agenda 21
stressed how sustainable development could be used as a means of achieving a
233
higher quality of life for all. The absence of a corresponding principle in “The
234
Future We Want” demonstrates yet another way the viewpoint of developed
countries was missing from Rio+20.
Part of the reason for the missing viewpoint is likely because some major
235
developed countries did not heavily participate in Rio+20. For example,
prominent leaders of developed countries, such as U.S. President Barack Obama,
U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
236
chose not to attend the conference. Without these leaders, it is not surprising
the views of developed countries were missing from “The Future We Want.”
Given the missing viewpoint, the one-sided outcome document was bound to be
a failure since it marked the lack of consensus and cooperation between
237
developed and developing countries.
B. Successes and Failures
Although Rio+20 had a few successes, they have largely been overshadowed
238
by its perceived failures. Some categorize Rio+20 as a success because it was
239
able to attract a large number and variety of participants. The participants also

226. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
227. E.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 8.
228. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
229. See supra Part III.A.1.
230. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 8.
231. Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 5.16, 5.43.
232. Rio Declaration, supra note 4, at princ. 8.
233. Agenda 21, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 5.16, 5.43.
234. See supra Part III.A.2.
235. Horner, supra note 13, at 60.
236. Polly Botsford, Environmental Law Gets Radical, 66 NO. 5 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 34, 37 (2012). See
also Horner, supra note 13, at 60 (stating President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron did not plan on
attending the conference).
237. Kelly, supra note 6, at 454.
238. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 4.
239. Id. at 2.
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took the first step of acknowledging the unresolved problems from previous
conferences and recognized the need for “an inclusive, transparent, strengthened
240
and effective multilateral system” to address sustainable development.
Furthermore, the outcome document identified “the growing gap between what
countries need to do, what they have pledged to do, and what they are actually
241
doing.” This general acknowledgment of the problems and need to further
sustainable development is a step forward in the right direction. Therefore, some
242
leaders in developing countries have embraced Rio+20 and have even moved
243
for “swift implementation” of its commitments. This is not surprising given the
244
contents of the outcome document discussed above. Thus, while some
245
developing countries believe Rio+20 did not meet their original expectations,
they still see it as “a platform for continued discussions on sustainable
246
development.” However, Rio+20 marks but one-step on the long journey
toward attaining sustainable development.
“The Future We Want” has faced sharp criticism and been viewed as a
247
disappointment by a variety of groups that see it as “vague and weak” because
of the results caused by the lack of cooperation and consensus between the
248
developed and developing nations. For example, environmental and antipoverty advocates have criticized Rio+20 for lacking the detail and ambition
required to address challenges of sustainable development and poverty
249
eradication. Additionally, the European Union Environment Commissioner,
Janez Potocnik, stressed that Rio+20 “did not lead to all the results [the European
250
Union] hoped for.” The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
240. UN Meeting Debates how to Improve Multilateral System for Sustainable Development Aims, UN
NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42977&Cr=ecosoc&Cr1=.
241. Tabau, supra note 17, at 168.
242. UNGA Debate Speakers, supra note 191 (the outcome document finds particular support from
Angola, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Grenada, Oman, Portugal, Sierra
Leone, and Sri Lanka among others.).
243. Id. (finding Angola favors implementing The Future We Want). See also Egypt: Minister –
Sustainable Development Requires Political Will, Regional Cooperation, ALL AFRICA (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210060240.html (finding Arab countries are seeking to implement the
recommendations of The Future We Want); At UN-backed Conference, African Countries Adopt Sustainable
Development Measures, supra note 169 (finding over forty African countries are seeking to implement the
recommendations of The Future We Want.).
244. See supra Part III.A.i.
245. E.g., UNGA Debate Speakers, supra note 191 (referring to Dominica and Sri Lanka).
246. Id.
247. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 4.
248. Tabau, supra note 17, at 168.
249. See Banisar et al., supra note 18, at 8 (criticizing Rio+20 for the “lack [of] specificity of what
reforms are needed to achieve [the themes], who needs to be involved in decision-making, and how the
[themes] will be achieved.”).
250. Martin Banks, EU Commissioner Admits Rio+20 Failed to Live Up to Expectations, THE
PARLIAMENT (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/eu-commissioneradmits-rio-20-failed-to-live-up-to-expectations/.
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Human Rights even released a statement calling Rio+20 a “missed
251
opportunity.”
Some of this criticism stems from the lack of new or detailed plans on how to
252
pursue sustainable development. Especially when this is combined with the
lack of any timeline for implementation, the outcome document fails to suggest
253
that it will be effective in addressing problems. For example, the parties did not
254
255
agree on any definition or general guidelines for the green economy. This is a
problem because any effective regime for sustainable development must take
256
“definitional issues into account rather than simply gloss over them,” which is
257
precisely what happened in the outcome document. Another fundamental
problem with “The Future We Want” was the discussion of the two themes of the
conference—the green economy and institutional framework for sustainable
258
development—“in isolation of each other.” This division suggested that they
were somehow mutually exclusive concepts despite critics’ calls for discussion of
259
the themes in combination with each other. Nor did “The Future We Want”
address other important issues such as “greening” existing systems in the
260
261
economy, removing the economic incentives for exploiting natural resources,
262
specifying Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), or addressing the
263
interaction between human rights and the new green economy. Likewise,
Rio+20 has been criticized for appearing to concentrate more on economics than
264
environmental protection. Even if some of these problems were fixed, the
outcomes of Rio+20 would likely still be seen as weak, simply because all
265
commitments are voluntary and the outcome document lacks enforcement
266
mechanisms. Overall, “The Future We Want” and Rio+20 have faced sharp
criticism in the international community, leaving the future of sustainable
development hanging in the balance.

251. UN Experts Call for More Protection of Human Rights of Vulnerable Groups Affected by Business
Activities, supra note 143.
252. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 4.
253. Id.
254. Banisar et al., supra note 18, at 8.
255. See Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 2.
256. Osofsky, supra note 27, at 119.
257. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
258. Banisar et al., supra note 18, at 8.
259. Id.
260. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 3.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 4.
263. UN Experts Call for more Protection of Human Rights of Vulnerable Groups Affected by Business
Activities, supra note 143.
264. Horner, supra note 13, at 61.
265. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 4.
266. Id.

127

05_ELLISON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2014 4:30 PM

2014 / Sustainable Development Efforts
C. Future of Sustainable Development in Light of Rio+20
Given the tension between developing and developed countries, the
outcomes of Rio+20, and the lack of participation by developed countries at
267
Rio+20, the outlook for the future of sustainable development is bleak. United
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put it best when he said, “Rio+20 has
given us a solid platform to build on, and the tools to build with. Now is the time
268
to follow up, to get down to work, to get practical.” Fortunately, there is a wide
269
range of interest in sustainable development from countries around the world.
Yet, there is a growing consensus that the future success of sustainable
development does not lie in the hands of international lawmakers, but instead
depends on the actions of individual countries, companies, and individual citizens
270
as opposed to agreed-upon collective actions by the international community.
The Egyptian Minister of State for Environmental Affairs, Moustafa Hussein
Kamel, observed how “realizing sustainable development requires political will
271
and regional cooperation.” Both of these necessary elements were absent at
272
Rio+20. “The Future We Want” is correct when it reiterated “the need to work
273
collectively” to achieve sustainable development; however, when major
274
developed countries do not fully participate and their views are not captured in
275
an outcome document, any outcome is bound to be a failure. What is needed is
a conscious choice by the international community to reach an agreement that
276
takes into account the viewpoints of both developing and developed countries.
Accordingly, future agreements should incorporate issues that are important to
these two groups. For example, future agreements should respect the views of
both developing and developed countries and look to both overpopulation and
overconsumption as causes of environmental degradation that need to be
rectified. Reaching this balance is a difficult, but necessary task. Thus, given the
current political stance of developing and developed countries, the future of

267. Id.
268. UN Meeting Debates How to Improve Multilateral System for Sustainable Development Aims, supra
note 240.
269. Kettunen & ten Brink, supra note 138, at 1.
270. Id.
271. Egypt: Minister–Sustainable Development Requires Political Will, Regional Cooperation, supra
note 243.
272. See supra Parts III.A-B. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 14.
273. The Future We Want, supra note 14, at ¶ 166. See also J.C. Suresh, supra note 134 (finding a need
for collective collaboration within the international community at all levels).
274. Botsford, supra note 236, at 37.
275. See supra Part III.A.2.
276. UN Meeting Debates How to Improve Multilateral System for Sustainable Development Aims, supra
note 240 (President of United Nations General Assembly Vuk Jeremic stating, “the outcome of the Rio+20
conference highlighted, once again, that more coherence and coordination is required if the diverse challenges
we face today are to be decisively and successfully addressed.”).
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sustainable development appears grim unless countries are willing to make the
conscious choice to cooperate to further sustainable development efforts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the tension between developing and developed countries
resulted in Rio+20 producing a one-sided outcome document favoring
277
developing countries. The views of developed countries were notably absent in
278
the outcomes encompassed in “The Future We Want.” This marked a change
from previous international environmental agreements like the Rio Declaration
279
and Agenda 21 that respected the views of both groups.
The one-sided nature of Rio+20 undermined advancing sustainable
280
281
development on a global scale, which resulted in it being a failure overall.
Efforts on the international level will continue to fail until the leadership in all
282
countries makes the conscious choice to cooperate with each other. Without the
necessary political will, little more will be done internationally to advance
sustainable development.
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